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           STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) because this is an appeal from a final decision of the District 
Court.  This appeal has been transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
    STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
 A. Questions Presented and Standards of Review 
 
1. Did the District Court err in entering its Order dismissing Deer Crest 
Associates I, L.C.’s (“Deer Crest”) Complaint and entering judgment in favor of Silver 
Creek Development Group, L.L.C. (“Silver Creek”)?   
2. Has the appellant preserved and/or asserted any legally recognized ground 
for challenging the binding decision of the arbitrator? 
B. Standards of Review 
New issues on appeal:  Claims not raised in the district court may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal.  Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 26, 158 P.3d 540 (Utah 2007).  
A party must give the district court an opportunity to address the purported error or is 
precluded from raising the issue on appeal.  Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 
1256 (Utah 2007).   
District Court’s Findings:  A trial court’s factual findings will not be disturbed 
unless they are shown by marshaling of all evidence in the record supporting the trial 
court’s findings to be clearly erroneous.  U.R.C.P. 52(a); Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LC v. 
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Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ¶ 46, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41.  The application of law to facts 
found at trial is a mixed question of fact and law.  Wayment v. Howard, 2007 UT 56, ¶ 9, 
144 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2007).  This Court defers to the district court’s application of law to 
the facts, granting broad deference when the issue is extremely fact dependent.  Id.  “In 
addition, when appealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty to 
marshal the evidence.”  Id.  The law applied is reviewed for correctness.  Jones v. 
Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ¶ 11, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007).  
District Court’s Conclusions of Law:  Legal conclusions should be “reviewed for 
legal correctness.”  Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 861 
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) (“We accord the trial court’s conclusions of law no deference 
but instead review them for correctness.”); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) (“[W]e afford no deference because they 
are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness.”).    
 C.  Issue Preservation   
 
Silver Creek asserts that Deer Crest has not properly preserved various issues for 
appellate review.  This Court’s rules require an appellant to demonstrate that issues raised 
on appeal were properly raised and preserved in the district court.    U.R.A.P 24(a)(5)(A), 
(B).  Deer Crest has failed to comply with this Rule.  Further, because Deer Crest raises 
new issues for the first time on appeal, Silver Creek had no opportunity to address such 
issues below. 
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          DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. § 78B-11-101 et seq is of central importance to this appeal.   
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
This is an action commenced by Deer Crest for Silver Creek’s alleged breach of a 
contract for the construction of a portion of a condominium project in Wasatch County, 
Utah.  Deer Crest filed this action in December 2007 against Silver Creek in District 
Court.  Silver Creek filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Deer Crest had not 
made a demand for arbitration within thirty days after its claim had arisen, as provided 
for under the parties’ Agreement and therefore Deer Crest’s claim was barred.  Record on 
Appeal (“R”) at 39-45.  In the alternative, Silver Creek sought an order from the Court 
compelling arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in § 19.1 of the construction 
contract.  Id.  The District Court granted Silver Creek’s motion to compel arbitration and 
stayed the matter pursuant to statutory requirements.  R. 76-78.  The District Court ruled 
that Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial determination when it entered into an explicit 
agreement to resolve all disputes by binding arbitration.   
Deer Crest then filed a claim with the American Arbitration Association.  In 
response thereto Silver Creek filed a Motion to Dismiss and argued that Deer Crest had 
not made a timely demand for arbitration under the provisions of the construction 
agreement and thus, the American Arbitration Association lacked jurisdiction to consider 
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Deer Crest’s claim.  The arbitrator agreed and issued a written decision in which it ruled 
that “Deer Crest waived its right to arbitration under the Contract Documents by failing 
to file its demand within the time set forth in the Contract Documents.  Therefore, [the 
court ruled] AAA lacks further jurisdiction to resolve this matter under the Contract 
Documents.”  R. at 81.  Consequently, Deer Crest’s claim was dismissed from 
Arbitration.  Id.   
B. Disposition in the District Court 
After the Arbitrator dismissed Deer Crest’s claim as untimely, Deer Crest moved 
the District Court to lift the stay to allow it to litigate its claims in district court.  R. 78-
80.  Silver Creek opposed the motion on the grounds that Deer Crest’s claims against 
Silver Creek had been dismissed in arbitration pursuant to a binding arbitration 
agreement, and Deer Crest was precluded from asserting its claims in the courts.  R. at 
92-111.  Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court denied Deer Crest’s 
Motion to Lift Stay and dismissed Deer Crest’s Complaint with prejudice, awarding 
Silver Creek its attorney fees.  R. at 194-198.  
C.  Statement of Facts  
In July of 2005 the parties to this matter entered into an Agreement which contains 
a mandatory arbitration clause, stating the following: 
All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to 
this Agreement, arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach 
thereof shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with Construction 
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association unless 
 5 
the parties mutually agree otherwise.  Notice of the demand for arbitration 
shall be filed in writing with the other party to the Agreement and with the 
American Arbitration Association.  The demand shall be made within (30) 
days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen. . .The 
award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be 
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof.   
 
R. at 23-27; Agreement § 19.1(emphasis added), addendum Exhibit A.  
On February 5, 2007 Deer Crest terminated its Agreement with Silver Creek 
because of Silver Creek’s alleged failure to timely complete the work pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreement.  R. at 86. 
In December 2007, approximately ten (10) months after the claim arose, Deer 
Crest originally filed its claims against Silver Creek in the District Court for the Fourth 
District of Utah, Heber Department.  R. at 3-6.  In response, Silver Creek filed a Motion 
to Dismiss asking the Court to dismiss the action as untimely pursuant to the contractual 
limitation period agreed to by the parties.  R. at 40.  In the alternative, Silver Creek 
requested the court to dismiss the judicial action and order the parties to arbitration.  Id.
 On February 5, 2008 the District Court issued its Ruling and Order denying Silver 
Creek’s Motion to Dismiss in part, but granting the alternative request for arbitration.  R. 
at 76-78.  The Court ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute and stayed the judicial 
proceedings “pending completion of the arbitration.”  Id.; Ruling and Order, addendum 
Exhibit B.  In refusing to grant Silver Creek’s motion to dismiss, the Court referenced 
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and adopted Deer Crest’s position that “the timeliness of a demand for arbitration is for 
the arbitrator to decide.”  Id; Ruling and Order p. 2. 
 On March 13, 2008, more than thirteen (13) months after the claim arose, Deer 
Crest commenced arbitration proceedings by filing a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate with 
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).  Thereafter, Silver Creek filed a Motion 
to Dismiss, again raising the argument that Deer Crest’s claims were not asserted within 
the contractual limitation period for the filing of claims. R at 81-87. 
 On August 5, 2008, the arbitrator issued a written Ruling on Respondent’s Motion 
to Dismiss.  (“Arbitrator’s Ruling”, addendum Exhibit C; R at 81-87).  The arbitrator 
carefully analyzed the contract between the parties, including § 19.1 in particular, and 
concluded that the parties agreed to require that any claim be filed within thirty (30) days 
after the claim, dispute or other matter in question arises.  Arbitrator’s Ruling, p. 3; R at 
81-87. 
 The arbitrator then considered the question of when the claim arose and 
concluded, as a matter of law, that the claims could not have arisen any later than 
February 5, 2007, “the date Deer Crest terminated its contract with Silver Creek because 
of breach.”  R. 81-87.  Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that Deer Crest’s claim was 
untimely and granted Silver Creek’s Motion to Dismiss.  Id.  Significantly, Deer Crest 
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has not challenged the arbitrator’s determination that its claim was untimely under the 
contract. 
 Deer Crest subsequently filed a Motion to Lift the Stay in the District Court from 
which this appeal is taken.  R. at 79-80.  By its Motion, Deer Crest sought to litigate this 
matter in District Court after it was dismissed from arbitration.  Silver Creek filed an 
opposition to Deer Crest’s Motion and asked that the Court dismiss Deer Crest’s 
Complaint with prejudice.  R. at 92-111.  After briefing and oral argument on Deer 
Crest’s Motion to Lift Stay, the District Court dismissed the case with prejudice and 
entered judgment in favor of Silver Creek.  R. at 194-198.  (“Order”, addendum Exhibit 
D; R at 194-198).   The District Court based its Order on the following findings of fact 
and conclusions of law: 
Findings of Fact: 
1) That the matter was properly referred to arbitration and that the arbitrator issued 
a written ruling granting Silver Creek’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that Deer Crest 
failed to file a demand for arbitration within the thirty day limitation period set 
forth in the parties’ agreement.  Because of Deer Crest’s failure to file a timely 
claim, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest’s claim.  R. at 197. 
 
2)  On July 1, 2005, the parties entered into an AIA A101-1997 Standard Form of 
Agreement Between Owner and Contractor (“Agreement”).  Paragraph 19.1 of the 
Addenda to that Agreement, which was made an enforceable part of the 
Agreement, requires that “[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question 
between the parties to this Agreement, arising out of or relating to this Agreement 
or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration ... .  The demand [for 
arbitration] shall be made within thirty (30) days after the claim, dispute or other 
matter in question has arisen.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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3)  The Court, having reviewed the record, found that Deer Crest’s demand for 
arbitration was filed beyond the thirty day limitation period set forth in paragraph 
19.1 of the parties’ agreement.  Id. 
 
Conclusions of Law: 
 
1)  That the Agreement between the parties is enforceable, and that the parties 
knowingly and intentionally agreed to submit any claim or dispute arising out of 
the Agreement to binding arbitration and agreed to be bound by paragraph 19.1 of 
the Agreement and the thirty (30) day limitation on the time for filing an 
arbitration demand contained therein.  R. at 196. 
 
2)  That Deer Crest’s execution of the Agreement constituted a knowing and 
intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under Article I, §§7 and 11 of 
the Utah Constitution.1  See Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah 2007).  The 
Court concluded that strict enforcement of paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement would 
not violate Deer Crest’s constitutional rights.  R. at 196. 
 
3)  The Court concludes that Deer Crest having waived any right to a judicial 
remedy, and having had its arbitration claim dismissed for failure to timely file the 
same, Deer Crest has no right to seek a judicial remedy.  R. at 196. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Notably, Deer Crest has not properly challenged the District Court’s determination that 
Deer Crest knowingly and intentionally waived its right to a judicial remedy when it 
executed the Agreement.  Although the Court characterized Deer Crest’s waiver as a 
conclusion of law, it is either a finding of fact or a mixed question of fact and law.  As 
such, appellant is required to marshal the evidence.  Deer Crest has not marshaled the 
evidence to challenge this finding.  Indeed, the pertinent and unrebutted fact is that Deer 
Crest signed the Agreement.  See U.R.C.P. 52(a); Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LC v. Bluffdale 
City, 2007 UT 57, ¶ 46, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41(A trial court’s factual findings will not be 
disturbed unless they are shown by marshaling to be clearly erroneous); see also 
Wayment v. Howard, 2007 UT 56, ¶ 9, 144 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2007) (Appellate Courts 
defer to the district court’s application of law to the facts, granting broad deference when 
the issue is fact dependent).  To the extent Deer Crest has challenged the Trial Court’s 
findings of fact, such should be disregarded for its failure to marshal.   
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   SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
  Deer Crest’s Complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice from the District 
Court because the Court had no authority or jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest’s claim as it 
had been dismissed pursuant to a valid arbitration proceeding.  Deer Crest has not 
challenged the arbitrator’s decision on any statutorily recognized grounds.  By 
intentionally and knowingly entering into a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate, 
Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial determination of its claims against Silver Creek.    
 Finally, Deer Crest’s constitutional rights have not been violated because an 
arbitration proceeding affords due process and provides a party their “day in court” to the 
same extent as judicial proceedings. 
     ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER DISMISSING DEER CREST’S 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
 
1. The District Court Properly Dismissed Deer Crest’s Complaint With 
Prejudice Because the District Court Had No Authority to Hear the Matter 
as it Had Been Dismissed by an Arbitrator Acting Within the Scope of and 
Pursuant to a Valid Arbitration Proceeding. 
 
It is well established in Utah that “[a]rbitration is a method of dispute resolution 
involving one or more neutral third parties whose decision is binding.”  Miller v. USAA 
Casualty Insurance Company, 44 P.3d 663, 673 (Utah 2002).  At arbitration, parties are 
afforded the opportunity to present evidence and examine witnesses.  After evaluation of 
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the evidence, the arbitrator makes an award resolving the issues presented.  Of paramount 
importance is the fact that “the arbitration award is binding and enforceable in court.”  
Miller at 673; U.C.A. § 78B-11-123; see also 4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute 
Resolution § 193 (2008) (an arbitrator’s judgment has the same effect as a judgment of a 
court of last resort); General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Harmon, 157 S.W.2d 126 (1941) 
(the arbitration judgment, if within the scope of the arbitration agreement, is as binding 
on the parties as a judgment of a court of law). 
 Under Utah law it has long been established that the award of an arbitrator 
determines the rights of parties as efficiently as a judgment secured by legal procedure 
and is binding on the parties until set aside or its validity is questioned in some proper 
manner.  Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d 353 (Utah 1932).  Indeed, “a court has no 
authority to review the action of arbitrators to correct errors or to substitute its conclusion 
for that of the arbitrators acting honestly and within the scope of their authority.”  Id. at 
356.   
 In very limited situations, the law provides a mechanism whereby parties who are 
dissatisfied with an arbitration decision may seek review.  However, judicial review of 
arbitration decisions is only on narrowly prescribed statutory grounds and is only 
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available in certain circumstances.2  See also DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 
1246 (Utah 1994) (judicial review of arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope 
or encourage repetitive adjudications but should be limited to the statutory grounds and 
procedures for review).  Further, an arbitration award will not be disturbed on account of 
irregularities or informalities in the proceeding or because the court does not agree with 
the award.  Id.    
Deer Crest and Silver Creek entered into a negotiated and binding written contract 
which provided that all disputes arising thereunder would be submitted to and resolved 
by binding arbitration.  See Agreement at § 19.1.  By entering into a binding arbitration 
                                                          
2
  See U.C.A. § 78B-11-124: (1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration 
proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: 
     (a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
     (b) there was: 
     (i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; 
     (ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or 
     (iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration 
proceeding; 
     (c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for 
postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise 
conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to substantially prejudice 
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
     (d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority; 
     (e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration 
proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later than 
the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or 
     (f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an 
arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to substantially prejudice the rights of 
a party to the arbitration proceeding. 
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agreement, the parties intentionally and knowingly waived their rights to have their 
claims resolved judicially.  The parties’ agreement to arbitrate is an enforceable and 
binding contractual agreement that precludes the parties from asserting claims in court.  
See Duke v. Graham, discussed infra.  Deer Crest signed the Agreement and agreed to its 
terms.  See Agreement.  In fact, Deer Crest acknowledged the binding nature of the 
Agreement by submitting its claims to arbitration.  R. at 81-87.  Deer Crest’s claims were 
subsequently adjudicated in arbitration and dismissed as having been untimely filed.  Id. 
Because the parties contractually agreed to mandatory binding arbitration and because 
Deer Crests’ claims have been dismissed with finality from an arbitration proceeding, no 
judicial appeal lies. 3  
Deer Crest cannot simply choose to set aside the arbitration decision because it 
disagrees with the outcome.  Nor can the court second guess or review the arbitrator’s 
decision, even though it disagrees with the decision.  Therefore, the District Court’s 
Order should be affirmed and Deer Crest’s Appeal must be denied pursuant to the above 
authorities which hold that a decision reached in a valid arbitration proceeding is binding 
                                                          
3
 Deer Crest now seeks to ignore the parties’ contractual agreed-upon procedure 
for the adjudication of all disputes.  Deer Crest argues that although it had knowingly and 
intentionally waived its right to a judicial determination of its claims, it should 
nonetheless have the opportunity to litigate its claims in district court after a decision 
dismissing this matter was rendered in a valid and binding arbitration proceeding.  See 
Brief generally.  
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on the parties to the same extent as a judgment rendered in a court of law.  See Miller at 
673.4 
2. The District Court Properly Concluded That The Parties Waived Their 
Rights to a Judicial Determination of All Claims. 
 
Parties express their clear intention to waive their rights to a judicial determination 
of claims when they contract for and select mandatory binding arbitration as the sole 
forum for adjudication.  Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has recently affirmed this 
principle and held that “an agreement ... to submit to arbitration any existing or 
subsequent controversy arising between the parties to an agreement is valid, enforceable, 
and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of 
a contract.”  Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 542 (Utah 2007).  The Duke Court further 
held that parties waive “their right to a judicial proceeding through an express agreement 
to arbitrate” Id. at 546; See also Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 23 P.3d 1035, 1039–
1040 (Utah 2001) (where the Utah Supreme Court held that a written arbitration 
                                                          
4
 Arbitration is not a mediation proceeding whereby parties voluntarily come 
together to reach settlement; rather, it is a “method of dispute resolution . . . whose 
decision is binding.”  Miller at 673.  As outlined above, the law in fact provides a means 
whereby dissatisfied parties are able to challenge and appeal an arbitrator’s decision in 
court; however, Deer Crest’s motion to lift the stay and re-commence litigation in district 
court is not an authorized means recognized under Utah law.  See U.C.A. § 78B-11-124 
(outlining the narrow and limited grounds upon which a party may ask the court to vacate 
an arbitration decision).  A party is not free to simply ask that the court start over again 
and re-litigate the matter just because the party disagrees with the arbitration decision.   
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agreement constitutes a waiver of parties’ rights to formal litigation and that when a party 
has waived its rights to a judicial determination, the court is barred from revisiting the 
arbitrator’s decision).5   
Here, the District Court concluded that: 
. . . the Agreement between the parties is enforceable, and . . . the parties 
knowingly and intentionally agreed to submit any claim or dispute arising 
out of the Agreement to binding arbitration and agreed to be bound by 
paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement and the thirty (30) day limitation on the 
time for filing an arbitration demand contained therein. 
 
R. at 196. 
The District Court then analyzed the above Utah authorities and concluded that 
pursuant to the Agreement’s arbitration provision 
. . . Deer Crest’s execution of the Agreement constitutes a knowing and 
intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under Article I, §§7 and 
11 of the Utah Constitution.  See Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah 
2007).   
 
R. at 196. 
The District Court’s conclusion is supported by Utah law and should be affirmed.  
Although Deer Crest does its best to distinguish the holdings of the foregoing authorities, 
                                                          
5
 Deer Crest’s attempt to distinguish Kenny is unpersuasive under the facts of this appeal.  
Kenny simply stands for the principle that where a party is contractually bound to follow 
certain procedures and timelines in order to invoke specified contractual rights, and the 
party fails to do so, the party waives his or her rights. Kenny at 998.  Moreover, the trial 
court in Kenny did not provide a second recourse to a party when that party’s claims had 
been dismissed in an arbitration proceeding.  Id.    
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it fails to do so.  As conceded by Deer Crest, “where a party is contractually bound to 
follow certain procedures and timelines in order to invoke a specific contractual right and 
fails to do so, the party waives that right.”  See Brief at 13; see also Kenny v. Rich, 186 
P.3d 989 (Utah App. 2008); Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 966 (Utah 1998). 
 Here, Deer Crest knowingly entered into the Agreement to arbitrate its claims 
against Silver Creek.  R. at 196-197; see also Agreement.  Because the Agreement was an 
“express agreement to arbitrate”, Deer Crest “waived its right to a judicial proceeding . . 
.” Duke at 542.  This case encompasses the precise situation as envisioned by Duke, i.e., 
because the Agreement is clear and unambiguous as to the parties’ intent to arbitrate their 
claims, the parties waived their rights to a judicial determination of any claims arising 
under the Agreement.   
Deer Crest was bound by its agreement to arbitrate.  Deer Crest failed to submit its 
claim to arbitration in a timely manner and therefore the arbitrator correctly dismissed the 
same.  The District Court then correctly determined that because Deer Crest had waived 
its right to a judicial adjudication of its claims against Silver Creek, it had no jurisdiction 
or authority to review or ignore the arbitrator’s order.  Therefore, judicial dismissal of 
Deer Crest’s Complaint was mandated.  R. at 194-198. 
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3. The District Court’s Dismissal of Deer Crest’s Complaint Did not Violate 
Due Process or The Open Court’s Provision of the Utah Constitution.   
 
As set forth above, the District Court applied established Utah law and properly 
concluded that “strict enforcement of paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement would not violate 
Deer Crest’s constitutional rights.”  R. at 196. 
Utah law supports the District Court’s conclusion that a freely-entered-into 
arbitration agreement is a valid waiver of judicial process and does not violate the parties’ 
rights to due process. Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah 2007); Jenkins v. 
Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998); Lindon City v. Eng’rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 
1070, (Utah 1981) (where the Utah Supreme Court held that due process of law does not 
necessarily mean judicial action; rather, due process is in fact afforded by arbitration).  
As in Duke, Deer Crest’s argument that it was not afforded due process “fails because 
[Utah Courts] have clearly held that arbitration proceedings do not violate [Due Process 
or the Utah Open Court’s provision] . . . [when] the parties have waived their right to a 
judicial proceeding through an express agreement to arbitrate.”  Duke at 546. 
Deer Crest does not contest this principle; rather, Deer Crest simply makes the 
unsupported argument that since the full merits of its claims have not been heard in the 
District Court, that its constitutional rights have been violated.  However, the District 
Court concluded that based on Deer Crest’s knowing and intentional waiver of its right to 
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a judicial determination, the court was divested of authority to hear the matter.6  R. at 
196.  Thus, pursuant to Duke, the trial court’s dismissal of Deer Crest’s claims do not 
violate Deer Crest’s constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause or the Open 
Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution.  Duke at 546. 
Moreover, Deer Crest’s argument that it was denied due process because the full 
merits of its claims were not heard is undermined by long-established Utah law.  The 
appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that a dismissal with prejudice based on 
procedural deficiencies does not violate due process or parties’ constitutional rights. 
Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646 (Utah App. 2004).7   
Therefore, because Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial adjudication of its 
claims against Silver Creek and because its claims were properly dismissed from 
arbitration, the trial court did not violate Deer Crest’s constitutional rights in dismissing 
its Complaint with prejudice.   
                                                          
6
 As set forth in Section I, above, Courts have authority to review arbitration awards only 
on narrowly proscribed statutory grounds.  Deer Crest has not challenged the arbitrator’s 
ruling on any of these narrow grounds. 
7
 See also Gordon v. Maughan, 204 P.3d 189 (Utah App. 2009) (where Utah Court of 
Appeals held that the dismissal of an appeal from justice court when defendant failed to 
follow appropriate procedures did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights); 
Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753 (Utah App. 2002) (where Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed dismissal with prejudice on procedural grounds when plaintiff failed to 
prosecute its case).  
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4. The Arbitrator’s Decision to Apply the Thirty Day Time Limit to Seek 
Arbitration Is Binding and Enforceable. 
 
 Contrary to Deer Crest’s argument, the Trial Court did not apply a thirty day 
statute of limitations to Deer Crest’s claims against Silver Creek; rather, the Court 
dismissed the case based on the parties’ Agreement and upon a final decision entered by 
the Arbitrator.  R. at 196.  However, even if the thirty day limitation set forth in section 
19.1 of the Agreement is construed as a statute of limitations, such is not unreasonable. 
Utah courts have endorsed the widely applied principle that parties may agree on a 
shorter limitation of time for commencing an action for breach than is provided by the 
statute of limitations.  This principle has been confirmed and established as far back as 
1919 in Clark v. Lund, 184 p. 821 (Utah 1919) (parties to a contract may agree on a 
shorter limitation of time for commencing an action for breach than is provided by the 
statute of limitations, provided the period agreed on is not unreasonable) and affirmed by 
the Supreme Court in Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 595 P.2d 863 
(Utah 1979) (where Supreme Court held that Contractual limitations of time in which to 
bring actions on contract, if reasonable, are valid, binding and enforceable).8 
                                                          
8
 Other jurisdictions generally are in agreement with Utah law.  Under Massachusetts 
law, contracting parties may agree upon a shorter limitation period as long as it is 
reasonable.  Bull HN Information Systems, Inc. v. Hutson, 118 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. Mass. 
1999, rev'd on other grounds 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Massachusetts law). 
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Thus, the arbitrator made a well reasoned and well supported decision to enforce 
the thirty day contractual limitation period.  But that is not the issue on this appeal 
because the parties agreed to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision, without a right of 
appeal.  Consequently, the decision of the arbitrator, right or wrong, if made in good faith 
and without any violation of U.C.A. § 78B-11-124, is not subject to judicial review.  As 
noted above, in this case appellant has not raised below nor asserted in this appeal any 
ground to vacate the award under § 78B-11-124.  
Therefore, because Deer Crest expressly consented and agreed to bring any claim 
against Silver Creek within thirty days after it had arisen, because the law allows parties 
to contract for shorter time limitations than the applicable statute of limitation, and 
because the arbitrator’s decision is not subject to review or appeal, Deer Crest’s claims 
are barred as a matter of law.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Under New York law, parties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time 
within which an action must be commenced to a shorter period than that provided by the 
applicable statute of limitations. Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d 
1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying New York law). 
 
Under New York law, parties to a contract may designate a reasonable period of 
limitations within which a claim arising out of the contract is to be commenced, even if 
that period is shorter than the statutory period. North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. 
Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. USA, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) (applying NY 
law). 
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B. DEER CREST CANNOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF AMBIGUITY OF 
AGREEMENT IN ITS APPEAL BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED 
BELOW.   
 
Although Deer Crest briefly attempts to argue that the District Court erred by not 
finding the Agreement to be ambiguous as to the consequences of failing to abide with 
section 19.1 of the Agreement, Deer Crest has not properly preserved this issue for appeal 
and cannot be heard to argue it now.  See Brief at p. 15-16.  Deer Crest did not argue 
below that the Agreement was ambiguous and did not preserve this issue below or in its 
Docketing Statement.  R. at 143-150; 194-198.  It is well established that courts will not 
consider matters raised for the first time on appeal.  Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 
App. 1994); see also Brookside Mobile Home Park, LTD. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 14, 
48 P.3d 968, 972; see also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (stating 
that for an issue to be properly preserved for appellate review, it must be raised to a level 
of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it). 
 Here, as demonstrated from the trial court’s Order and record below, Deer Crest 
did not argue that the Agreement was ambiguous in the District Court proceedings.  
Therefore, Deer Crest’s argument that the Agreement is ambiguous with respect to the 
parties’ intentions of the consequences of failing to abide with section 19.1 of the 
Agreement must be disregarded.   
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     CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, Silver Creek respectfully requests 
that this Court deny Deer Crest’s Appeal and Affirm the District Court’s Order herein. 
DATED this ____ day of June, 2009. 
       HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
 
       ______________________________ 
       Evan A. Schmutz 
       Andy V. Wright 
       Attorneys for Silver Creek 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ____ day of June, 2009 she caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
 Eric G. Easterly 
 2524 Fairway Village Drive 
 P.O. Box 681238 
 Park City, Utah 84068-1238 
 
Sent Via: 
 
________  Hand-Delivery 
_________ Facsimile 
____X___  Mailed (postage prepaid)   
 
 
 
       _________________________________ 
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